Cindy Cohn and Bruce Schneier Argue the Government Has Spent Two Decades Collecting Our Data — That’s Long Enough

The United States has spent 25 years building a surveillance machine whose purpose has changed far faster than anyone expected. That is the argument Cindy Cohn and Bruce Schneier make in their essay 25 Years of Mass Surveillance Is Enough. The pair trace how the government moved from targeting specific suspects to collecting data on everyone, and how that shift now touches law enforcement, immigration, private security and even sports venues.

The story begins on September 11, 2001. The terrorist attacks created a national fear that the enemy could be anyone, anywhere. The government’s answer was simple: watch everyone, everywhere. That logic drove a move from targeted wiretaps to mass collection of telephone metadata, internet traffic and location data. Surveillance also pushed into everyday life. Facial recognition appears at Madison Square Garden. License plate readers sit on roads and in parking lots.

What Mass Surveillance Actually Collects

Mass surveillance today is not just a government operation. It is a pipeline that runs through private companies. Companies like Google and Facebook spy on their users as part of their business model. Governments then rely on that data, often through legal processes but increasingly through purchases and partnerships. FBI Director Kash Patel recently confirmed in congressional testimony that the agency buys information from data brokers and plans to keep doing so.

The essay describes the flow clearly:

“Governments primarily obtain the mass surveillance information through private companies.”

That means as companies collect more data for commercial reasons, more becomes available to law enforcement as well. The technology is also getting better, especially with AI. The authors warn that the problems accompanying mass surveillance grow as the tools improve.

The Numbers Behind the Shift

The essay cites several key dates and figures from the past quarter-century:

• The President’s Surveillance Program began under an argument of pure executive power, then secretly shifted to a novel reading of Section 215 of the Patriot Act in 2006.
• The government confirmed the program only after the 2013 Snowden disclosures.
• The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the government’s reading of Section 215 in 2015.
• Congress passed the USA Freedom Act later that same year.
• The USA Freedom Act ended indiscriminate mass collection of telephone records that had lasted nearly 14 years.
• The NSA’s Upstream program, which intercepted metadata and content from key telecommunications junctures, began soon after 9/11 under a claim of purely presidential authority.
• The program was brought under marginal congressional and programmatic Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court review via Section 702 of the 2008 FISA Amendments Act.
• In 2017, more than 15 years after the program’s inception, the NSA ended content searches due to FISA court pressure, though mass collection continues.

Why the Government Says It Works

The government has never fully analyzed the costs and benefits of these programs. There is no accounting of taxpayer dollars or diversion of resources from other efforts. There is no demonstration that these techniques stopped attacks that otherwise could not have been prevented. The essay notes that the NSA occasionally presents examples of successes, especially when the programs face public pressure. Those examples regularly fall apart on scrutiny.

The same applies to domestic use. There has never been a comprehensive analysis of whether immigration or law enforcement’s use of these techniques actually makes people safer, or whether other techniques could produce the same results. Instead, the police and the companies selling these tools offer anecdotes and dubious data. One example cited is Flock’s data, which equates the number of law enforcement hits in its database with actual crime solving.

Who Pays for Surveillance

The costs extend beyond privacy. The essay argues that mass surveillance has expanded far beyond its original purpose of defending against terrorist threats. It is now a routine tool used by law enforcement. ICE uses it in immigration actions and against people protesting. Private security systems at venues and on roads depend on it. The technology has become normal, and the government has not answered basic questions about whether it works.

The authors frame the question directly: “It seems reasonable to step back and evaluate the costs of this shift to mass surveillance, especially in terms of Americans’ rights and freedoms.”

The Limits of Oversight

The essay notes that the NSA’s Upstream program was brought under marginal congressional and programmatic FISA court review via Section 702 of the 2008 FISA Amendments Act. But the court’s pressure only ended content searches in 2017, more than 15 years after the program began. Metadata collection continues.

The authors also point to the 2013 Snowden disclosures, which forced the government to confirm programs it had kept secret for years. They note that the government confirmed the telephone record collection program after those disclosures, despite media and public interest groups struggling to force the government to reveal it as early as late 2005.

Where the Pipeline Leads

The interrelation between private and governmental mass surveillance is worth examining. Companies collect data for profit. Governments obtain it for enforcement. The pipeline from private collection to governmental collection means that as companies collect more, more is available to law enforcement as well. Access doesn’t just come through legal processes. It comes through purchases, partnerships and voluntary sharing.

The essay’s central claim is that this shift has gone too far. Twenty-five years after 9/11, the authors argue, it is time to step back and evaluate the costs of mass surveillance. They want a full accounting of taxpayer dollars, resource diversion and actual effectiveness. They want to know whether the trade-off is worth it.

The answer, as they present it, is that the government has never provided one.

What Happens Next

The essay does not propose specific fixes. It asks for scrutiny. It asks for answers to questions the government has never answered. It asks for a cost-benefit analysis of a system that has run for decades without one.

The authors are Cindy Cohn and Bruce Schneier. Their argument is simple: mass surveillance was pitched as a necessary defense against terrorist threats. It has become permanent. It has spread to areas far beyond national security. It has been justified with success stories that fall apart on scrutiny. And it has never been weighed against the costs to American rights and freedoms.

The essay is a call to step back. After 25 years, the authors argue, it is time to look at what the machine actually does and what it costs.

Key Facts Box

• 25 years since Sept. 11, 2001
• Telephone metadata collection ran nearly 14 years before USA Freedom Act
• NSA’s Upstream program ran more than 15 years before content searches ended
• USA Freedom Act passed in 2015
• FBI Director Kash Patel confirmed data broker purchases in recent testimony
• Snowden disclosures revealed programs in 2013

data brokers · government oversight · mass collection · privacy · surveillance